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ABSTRACT 
This dissertation consists of two studies related to internal capital markets and 
bank relationship using Japanese corporate spin-offs.  The first study analyzes the 
relation between internal capital markets and banks by examining 137 Japanese corporate 
spin-offs created between the years 2001 and 2003 (since the establishment of new spin-
offs law in 2001).  In a univariate analysis, we find significant positive average 
cumulative abnormal returns around the announcements, market-adjusted excess returns 
after the spin-offs, an increase of the Herfindahl index, and a reduction in the 
diversification discount after the spin-offs. In a cross-sectional analysis, we find that 
bank-related governance variables such as the keiretsu-affiliation indicator, bank loan to 
total asset ratio, main bank ownership, and indicator variable of the existence of a bank-
appointed director on the board indicator variables are significantly positively related to 
cumulative average abnormal returns around the announcements, market-adjusted excess 
returns after the spin-offs, an increase in focus of firms in terms of the Herfindahl index, 
and a reduction in the diversification discount.  Therefore, we conclude that there is a 
significant relationship between internal capital markets and banks in Japan; after the 
internal capital market reorganization through spin-offs the closer relationship with banks 
creates shareholder wealth and increases the focus of firms.  This paper is now co-
authored with Professor Yoon K. Choi. 
The second study analyzes the investment policy changes in internal capital 
markets and the effect of banks’ monitoring on the investment changes using Japanese 
corporate spin-offs, including merger-facilitated spin-offs within conglomerates.  We find 
that investment sensitivity increases significantly after internal restructuring through 
 ii
spin-offs, consistent with Gertner et al. (2002).  Furthermore, our results show that bank-
related spin-offs’ investments are more sensitive to investment opportunities, Tobin’s Q, 
after being spun off.  This suggests that the efficiency of Japanese internal capital 
markets has increased through spin-offs after the financial deregulation in 2001.  We 
conclude that banks seem to play significant monitoring roles in internal capital markets 
to increase the investment efficiency after spin-offs.  This paper is now co-authored with 
Professor Yoon K. Choi. 
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GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
This study examines whether the Japanese spin-offs create values for shareholders 
and increase the efficiency of internal capital markets.  Furthermore, this study 
investigates the efficiency changes in internal capital markets and the impact of banks’ 
monitoring in internal capital markets using Japanese corporate spin-offs.  Unlike other 
divestitures such as equity carve-outs or asset sales, spin-offs do not generate cash for the 
parent and the spun-off.  Because of the non-cash-generating features, spin-offs provide 
well-furnished natural experimental setting for internal capital market analysis.  In 
addition, the Japanese spin-offs are purely internal transactions.  Therefore, the Japanese 
spin-offs are well-furnished experimental setting for testing the relationship between 
internal capital markets and banks.  We find that the efficiency of internal capital markets 
are significantly related to bank relationships.  Thus, we conclude that banks seem to play 
a significant monitoring role in internal capital markets.  
Study One  
Internal Capital Markets and Bank Relationship 
-Evidence from Japanese Corporate Spin-offs 
Study one focuses on the Japanese corporate spin-offs and investigates the 
relationship between the efficiency of the internal capital markets and the roles of banks.  
The Japanese spin-offs dataset provides a unique setting because the banks play a critical 
role in the Japanese corporate structure and also the Japanese spin-offs are quite different 
from the U.S. spin-offs.  In the Japanese spin-offs, a division becomes a new subsidiary, 
but still remains under the control of the parent company, and thus its overall governance 
1 
  
structure does not change.  These restructurings are a purely internal transaction.  This 
has in important implication for the study of internal capital markets.  We can examine 
the effect of corporate restructuring on the efficiency of internal capital market without 
changing the ownership and control structure.  We elaborate on this issue when we 
discuss the details of the Japanese spin-offs  
Furthermore, this paper hypothesizes that banks can increase the efficiency of the 
internal capital market as the most informed external capital suppliers and monitors of 
firms.  A vast array of literature in banking discusses the uniqueness of banks and their 
long-run relationships with their client firms, which characterize the difference between 
banks and other financial entities.  The crucial roles of banks are to resolve the 
information asymmetries and agency problems between investors and firms. 
Consequently, the role of banks is instrumental in overcoming the inefficiency of internal 
capital markets.  It is well-known that the Japanese corporate structure is governed by 
bank-centered relationship. 
Study Two 
Internal Capital Markets, Investment, and Bank Relationship  
- Evidence from Japanese Corporate Spin-offs 
Investment policy of internal capital markets affects the efficiency of internal 
capital markets.  Internal capital markets are inefficient if cross-subsidization across 
divisions is not systematic: Capital of a firm may be misallocated from divisions with 
good investment opportunities to divisions with bad investment opportunities.  Spin-offs 
literature analyzes how firms increase efficiency of investment policy in internal capital 
2 
  
                                                
markets through spin-offs.1  Spin-offs allow us to examine the investment policy changes 
in internal capital markets because firms’ capital is reallocated through spin-offs. 
 This study focuses on the Japanese corporate spin-offs to investigate the 
relationship between internal capital markets’ efficiency of investment changes and banks.  
The Japanese spin-offs dataset provides a unique setting since the banks play a critical 
role in the Japanese corporate structure and also the Japanese spin-offs are purely internal 
transaction.2  Diamond (1984, 1991), among others, argues that banks monitor their client 
firms: We suggest that bank play such a role in internal capital market to ensure the 
efficient investment decisions.  
 Our empirical analysis is similar to Gertner et al.’s (2002) Tobin’s Q investment 
sensitivity analysis using panel data set of Japanese spin-offs.  Based on the parent firms’ 
bank related governance structure, we divide our sample into dichotomous settings, either 
bank-related or non-bank-related; keiretsu-affiliation, existence of bank-appointed 
directors, and bank or main bank ownership dummy variables (below- or above- sample 
median).  We find consistent results with Gertner et al. (2002) that investment sensitivity 
increases after internal restructuring through spin-offs.  Further more, our results show 
that bank-related spin-offs’ investments are more sensitive to investment opportunities, 
Tobin’s Q.  This suggests that banks increase the investment efficiency of internal capital 
market after spin-offs as the most informed monitors.  This result is consistent with the 
findings of Shin and Park (1999) that there is positive relationship between investment 
 
1 Gertner et al. (2002) show increase in investment sensitivity after spin-offs using spun-off divisions data, 
Dittmar and Shivdasani (2003) examine effect of divestitures in investment of parent firms, and Ahn and 
Denis (2004) study the changes of investment policy for the combined firm of parent and spun-offs. 
2 See Choi and Han (2005) for detail. 
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and investment opportunities where independent firms do not.  Also, Khanna and Palepu 
(2000) show that internal capital market of Indian business group affiliated firms is more 
efficient compared to non-affiliated firms.  
Overall Contribution 
Taken together, studies one and two of this dissertation provide several significant 
contributions.  First, and for most, this dissertation contributes to the internal capital 
markets literature from the angle of the uniqueness of banks and complements the 
monitoring role of the Japanese main bank literature. Kang, Shivdasani, and Yamada 
(2000) study Japanese domestic mergers in Japan, and show that the close bank 
relationship creates shareholder wealth and improves the investment efficiency.3  We 
provide evidence on the monitoring role of Japanese banks in internal capital markets, 
and show consistent results with Kang, Shivdasani, and Yamada (2000). 
  Second, this dissertation provides empirical evidence on the functions of 
Japanese corporate spin-offs not only create value for shareholders but also bring 
efficiency in internal capital markets.  All these empirical findings are related to recent 
deregulation of Japanese financial markets.  Deregulations through amendments of 
commercial codes are generally expected to bring efficiency in the market as an outcome 
of corporate efficiency.  This dissertation tests whether a financial deregulation improves 
the efficiency of financial markets.  The results of this dissertation provide empirical 
evidence to the mixed arguments on efficiency of internal capital markets.   
                                                 
3In the similar vein, Kaplan (1994), Kaplan and Minton (1994), and Kang and Shivdasani (1995, 1997) 
document the significant monitoring roles of Japanese banks. 
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Finally, this dissertation also suggests that bank related firms improve their 
investment efficiency of internal capital markets through spin-offs.  Remaining of this 
dissertation will discuss the details of empirical findings.   
5 
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STUDY ONE 
INTERNAL CAPITAL MARKETS AND BANK RELATIONSHIP 
- EVDIENCE FROM JAPANESE CORPORATE SPIN-OFFS 
Spin-offs are defined in the literature as a form of corporate divestiture in which a 
parent company separates one of its subsidiaries into an independent, publicly traded 
company and the new stocks from this independent company are distributed on a pro rata 
basis to the parent company’s shareholders.  Unlike other divestitures such as equity 
carve-outs or asset sales, spin-offs do not generate cash for the parent or the spun-off 
company.  Because of this non-cash-generating feature, spin-offs provide a well-
furnished natural experimental setting for internal capital market analysis.  Some argue 
that inefficiently diversified firms are valued at a relative discount when compared with a 
portfolio of stand alone firms because of inefficient internal capital markets.  Others 
argue that internal capital markets are efficient if headquarters oversees a small and 
focused set of projects (Stein(1997)). 
 This study focuses on the Japanese corporate spin-offs and investigates the 
relationship between the efficiency of the internal capital markets and the roles of banks.  
The Japanese spin-offs are interesting to examine given that banks play a critical role in 
Japanese corporate structure and also that Japanese spin-offs are quite different from U.S. 
spin-offs.  In the case of Japanese spin-offs, a division becomes a new subsidiary but still 
remains under the control of the parent company, and thus its overall governance 
structure does not change.  Any restructuring that takes place is purely an internal 
transaction.  This has in important implication for the study of internal capital markets.  
That is, the situation of Japanese spin-offs allows us to examine the effect of corporate 
12 
  
                                                
restructuring on the efficiency of the internal capital market without changing the 
ownership and control structure.  We later elaborate on this issue when we discuss the 
details of the Japanese spin-offs.  
Furthermore, this paper hypothesizes that banks can increase the efficiency of 
internal capital markets, which serve as the most informed external capital suppliers and 
monitors of firms.  A vast array of literature in banking discusses the uniqueness of banks 
and their long-term relationships with their client firms and characterizes the difference 
between banks and other financial entities.4  A crucial role of banks is to resolve 
information asymmetries and agency problems that develop between investors and firms. 
Consequently, banks are instrumental in overcoming the inefficiency of internal capital 
markets.  It is well-known that the Japanese corporate structure is governed by bank-
centered relationships. 
We investigate the 137 Japanese corporate spin-offs created between 2001 and 
2003 (since the establishment of the new Japanese corporate spin-offs law in April 2001).  
On April 1, 2001, the new Spin-offs Law became effective in Japan, and many firms 
started using the spin-offs in their reorganizations.  We find that there are significant 
positive abnormal returns around the announcement, significant positive market-adjusted 
returns after the spin-offs, a significant increase in focus of firms in terms of the 
Herfindahl index, and a significant reduction in the diversification discount.  In cross-
sectional analyses, announcement abnormal returns, post-spin-offs performance, 
 
4 Diamond (1984) and Fama (1985) argue that banks are unique because they have information that is not 
available to other external capital markets.  Diamond (1991) argues that banks’ information on client 
companies allows banks to monitor these firms, while Lummer and McConnell (1989) argue that banks are 
important and credible transmitters of firm-specific information to the capital market. 
13 
  
                                                
Herfindahl index increases, and reduction in the diversification discount are significantly 
positively related to bank relationship variables such as main bank, keiretsu-affiliation, 
bank ownership, and existence of bank-appointed directors.  
Internal capital markets literature reports that after spin-offs are completed, the 
efficiency of the firm increases significantly. Desai and Jain (1999) find that both 
announcement period and long-term abnormal returns for the focus-increasing spin-offs 
are significantly larger than those of non-focus-increasing spin-offs.  Gertner, Power, and 
Scharfstein (2002) show that spin-offs improve the allocation of capital by using the 
spun-off companies’ data.  Dittmar and Shivdasani (2003) show that divestiture reduces 
the diversification discount and increases the efficiency of segment investment.  Ahn and 
Denis (2004) show that there is a significant increase in investment efficiency, while the 
diversification discount is eliminated after spin-offs.   
This study also contributes to the internal capital market literature from the angle 
of the uniqueness of banks and complements the literature that focuses on the monitoring 
role of the Japanese main bank.  Kang, Shivdasani, and Yamada (2000) study Japanese 
domestic mergers in Japan and show that the close relationship between banks and firms 
creates shareholder wealth and improves the investment efficiency.5  We provide 
evidence on the monitoring role of Japanese banks in internal capital markets, and show 
consistent results with Kang, Shivdasani, and Yamada (2000). 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows.  In Section 2, we provide the 
background on the Japanese spin-offs examined.  In Section 3, we describe the data and 
 
5In the similar vein, Kaplan (1994), Kaplan and Minton (1994), and Kang and Shivdasani (1995, 1997) 
document the significant monitoring roles of Japanese banks. 
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descriptive statistics of Japanese corporate spin-offs.  In Sections 4 and 5, we analyze and 
interpret the empirical results.  Section 6 summarizes the major tenets of our arguments. 
Japanese Corporate Spin-offs 
The Japanese economy and its financial markets have been stumbling for the past 
decade after the collapse of the bubble economy in the late 1980s.  Since then, to 
reinvigorate the economy, the Japanese government has tried a wide range of 
deregulations through numerous revisions of the commercial codes.  In 1997, merger 
procedures were simplified, and the Revision of the Antimonopoly Law allowed 
establishment of pure holding companies, which had been banned since 1947.  In 1999, 
in conjunction with the simplified merger procedures and Antimonopoly Law, a stock 
swap system and stock transfer system were created to facilitate transactions between 
wholly-owned subsidiaries and their parent companies.  The 2000 Amendment of the 
Commercial Code introduced the procedures for a company split-up so as to make the 
restructuring through spin-offs or divestitures easier. On April 1, 2001, a new spin-off 
law came into effect, and, owing to the benefits of this new law, many Japanese firms 
chose to restructure and became involved in the spin-offs for their corporate 
restructurings.  Spin-offs are end-result of commercial codes revisions of the Japanese 
capital market in the late 1990s and the early 2000s.  Thus, the various revisions of 
relating to stock repurchases, holding companies, and simplified mergers and spin-offs 
have not only made the legal framework for spin-offs more in tune with the demands of 
15 
  
                                                
Japan’s internationalized capital markets, but they have also made executives of Japanese 
corporations more conscious of corporate value.6
Around the time of the Asian financial crisis at the end of the 1990s, Japanese 
corporations and the Japanese government had started to realize the need for corporate 
reorganizations, such as spin-offs or other divestitures, to improve the flexibility and 
efficiency of their corporate structures in the competitive international capital market.  
The institutional legal framework for Japanese corporate spin-offs began to change in 
1997, and many Japanese multi-divisional firms reorganized their internal capital markets 
by transforming divisions into independent units such as wholly-owned subsidiaries or 
spun-offs to obtain optimal internal capital market structure.  Before the enactment of the 
new corporate spin-offs law in April 2001, Japanese firms were required to be inspected 
by the federal court before doing the spin-offs.  They also needed to obtain an individual 
approval from creditors for the transfer of liabilities and assets, which impeded the 
flexible corporate restructuring.  The new commercial code revision in 2001 simplified 
that procedure.  In addition, before the new law was enacted, cash transactions were 
required; however, the new law allowed easier transactions accompanied by the stock 
swap and stock transfer systems changes in 1999.  Consequently, it became easier for 
firms to choose their optimal corporate structure by using the new corporate spin-offs 
laws. 
A widely-accepted definition in the literature of a spin-off is a case in which a 
parent company transfers a part of its assets to a newly created, independent company 
 
6 Japan Investor Relations and Investor Support, Inc. Research Newsletter, Issue No.1, December 2001 
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(usually a former subsidiary of the parent company), which then goes public.  The new 
company’s stocks are then distributed to the parent company’s shareholders at a pro rata 
base.  There are four different types of the Japanese spin-offs in terms of spun-off’s stock 
distributions.  First, the most commonly used method is to transfer the spun-off’s stocks 
to the parent company after the spin-off has taken place, which is technically similar to 
wholly-owned subsidiary.  The second method is identical to the traditional process of 
spin-offs mentioned above.  These two categories of Japanese spin-offs are subdivided 
into two different types in terms of the purpose of the spin-offs.   One type separates 
divisions in order to facilitate mergers either within the group or between the groups of 
companies.  In this case, the spin-off company announces the spin-offs and mergers at the 
same time; on the execution date these two transactions are completed simultaneously.  
The other type of spin-off is creating new companies by separating divisions from the 
parent company. 
Literature Review 
Internal Capital Markets 
Literature on efficiency of internal capital markets has mixed arguments. Lamont 
(1997) and Shin, and Stulz (1998) argue for inefficiency of internal capital markets 
because of inefficient cross-subsidization across the divisions.  Thus inefficient internal 
capital markets literature argues that diversified firms misallocate the capital to poorly 
performing divisions.  Rajan, Scharfstein, and Stein (2000) argue that rent-seeking 
behavior within the conglomerate worsens the diversified discount.  Lins and 
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Servaes’(1999) documents the international evidence on diversification discount for 
Germany, Japan, and United Kingdom.  They find that the Japanese and UK corporations 
have significant diversification discount while German corporations do not.    
In contrast, Matsusaka and Nanda (2002) and Stein (1997) argue for the 
efficiency of internal capital markets.  Stein (1997) diversified firms reduce the cost of 
financing and asymmetric information compared to stand alone firms because 
headquarters has information while other external entities do not. 
Internal Capital Markets and Spin-offs 
Desai and Jain (1999) find that both the announcement period and long-run 
abnormal returns for the focus-increasing spin-offs are significantly larger than those for 
non-focus-increasing spin-offs.  Gertner, Power, and Scharfstein (2002) show that spin-
offs improve the efficiency of capital allocation through spin-offs; these results are found 
primarily in the industries where the parent and spin-off firms are unrelated and in spin-
offs where announcement returns are higher.  Dittmar and Shivdasani (2003) show that 
divestiture reduces the diversification discount and increases the efficiency of segment 
investment, suggesting that inefficient investment is partly responsible for the 
diversification discount and supporting the corporate focus and financing hypothesis.  
Ahn and Denis (2004) study the changes of investment policy for the combined firm of 
parent and spun-off companies.   
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Japanese Banks  
There are four major bank-oriented Japanese corporate governance systems in 
existence: the main bank, bank-centered groups called keiretsu, bank ownership of firms 
and bank-sent managers.  The main banks are typically the major lenders to firms and 
play the role of information controller and monitor of the firm, intervening in financial 
decisions.  Among others, Hoshi et al. (1990) find that firms with a close relation with 
main banks are less liquidity constrained.  Also, main banks organize rescue programs 
when their client firms become financially distressed, and this insurance role leads them 
to monitor the firm more closely.  Kang and Shivdasani (1995) find that poorly 
performing firms are more likely associated with higher CEO turnovers when firms have 
a close relationship with main banks.  Kang et al. (2000) show that there is a significant 
positive relationship between the announcement returns of Japanese mergers and the loan 
amount from main bank.  They suggest that Japanese banks, as debt holders, perform an 
important monitoring function.   
Keiretsu 7 refers to a bank-centered long-term transactional relationship linked by 
“stable inter-corporate shareholding”8 between firms (Morck and Nakamura(1999)). 
Hoshi et al. (1990) find that the insurance and monitoring roles are more evident with 
keiretsu-affiliated firms.  Thus, bank-related Japanese corporate governance enhances the 
unique equity ownership structure, which involves cross shareholdings between 
                                                 
7 There are eight horizontal industrial groups in Japan, which are Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Sumitomo, Sanwa, 
Dai-Ichi Kangyo Bank, Fuyo, Tokai, and Industrial Bank of Japan.  
8 Morck and Nakamura (1999) define ‘stable shareholders’ as those who almost never sell out and 
consistently support management. 
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industrial firms and banks.9  Morck et al. (2000) find that there is a non-linear 
relationship between main bank ownership and firm value, showing that at low levels of 
ownership by main banks, firm value decreases as ownership increases, and the opposite 
is shown sometimes at higher levels.  Lastly, sometimes, Japanese banks appoint bankers 
to the board of firms for the purpose of managerial interventions and monitoring.  Kaplan 
and Minton (1995) find that if there is a bank-appointed director in the board, there is 
more frequent executive turnover when firms perform poorly. 
Methodology 
Event Study 
An event study measures the impact of a specific event on the value of a firm 
using financial market data. This is typically used with events relating to common stock 
returns, however, other securities can be used such as bond price returns. The measure of 
an abnormal stock return is the key ingredient of an event study. It is a very popular and 
useful technique due to the fact that, given the efficiency of the market, the effect of an 
event is reflected in security prices almost immediately. Hence, a measure of the event’s 
economic impact can be set using security prices observed over a relatively short time 
period. The procedure for such a study involves the specification of the event that could 
include such examples as quarterly earnings reports or corporate mergers.  Also the event 
time frame must be specified which usually includes time prior to and after an event. The 
                                                 
9 Morck, Nakamura, and Shivdasani (2000) explain the origins of Japanese bank ownership in detail. 
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first event study was conducted by Fama, Fisher, Jensen, and Roll (1969); it was an 
analysis of the effect of stock splits on firm value.  
If an event has an impact on security prices, we should observe significant 
abnormal return on the securities of interest on or around the event date. The measure of 
the events abnormal stock return is basically equal to the actual return minus normal 
return over a given time period.  There are many ways to measure abnormal returns. The 
normal return can use market returns or the constant mean return model, which uses a 
linear relationship between the market return and the security return. Brown and Warner 
(1985) discuss three ways to measure abnormal stock returns that are used very often. 
The first one is to calculate mean-adjusted returns. The abnormal return in this 
case is measured as the difference between the return on the event date and the average 
daily return on the asset over some estimation period (usually 250 trading days, or a year).  
The second method uses the market-adjusted return which is calculated as the difference 
between the asset and market index returns on day t (event date). The third way is to use 
the OLS market model: Ai,t = Ri,t – αi – βiRm,t , where Ai,t is the abnormal return on day t,  
Ri,t –  the total security return on day t, αi and βi are OLS values from the estimation 
period. These market returns involve market risk associated with its security compared to 
the market (Beta).  Market returns are typically a better measure for normal returns vs.  
the constant mean return model.  Recent studies have shown abnormal returns during 
earnings releases, corporate spin offs, how a company raises capital, stock splits, and 
mergers and acquisitions.  This study uses market model.  The market model parameters 
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are estimated using continuously compounded returns for the 258-day period, starting 
258 days before the spin-offs announcement date and (-1,0) event window is used 
Long Term Market-Adjusted Abnormal Returns 
We evaluate the post-spin-offs market-adjusted long-term abnormal returns using 
a method similar to that of Spiess and Graves (1995).  The market-adjusted returns for 
company i in t months after the ex-date are defined as 
ari,t = ri,t – rmkt, t
where ri,t is return of the company i in month t, and rmkt, t is Nikkei 225 Stock Average 
Index in month t.  The average market-adjusted return from the ex-date month to time t is 
calculated as 
ARi,t = n
1 ∑
=
n
t 1
 ari,t
Herfindahl Index 
The Herfindahl index measures the degree of corporate focus.  Desai and Jain 
(1999) classify a spin-off to be a focus-increasing spin-off if the Herfindahl index 
increases after the spin-off compared to the year before the spin-off.  A sales-based 
Herfindahl index, Hjt, calculates the degree which sales are concentrated in a few of a 
firm’s segment.  It is calculated across Njt segments for the j th firms in fiscal year t as the 
sum squares of each segment’s sales as a proportion of total sales: 
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Hjt = 2∑
=
Njt
i 1
( )]/[
1
∑
=
Njt
i
XijtXij
Where Xjt is the sales attribute to a segment.  Changes in focus is calculated difference 
between Hj,1 and Hj,-1. 
Diversification Discount 
 This paper finds the significant diversification discount on the value of spin-offs 
samples of Japanese firms.   This result is consistent with Lins and Servaes’(1999) 
findings when they examine the international evidence on diversification discount for 
Germany, Japan, and United Kingdom.  They find that the Japanese and UK corporations 
have a significant diversification discount while German corporations do not.  However, 
the diversification discount can be reduced or eliminated through internal capital market 
restructuring such as spin-offs (Ahn and Denis, 2004; Gertner et al., 2002; Desai and Jain, 
1999). We find that the diversification discounts in the Japanese firms are significantly 
reduced after the spin-offs.  Furthermore, the degree of reduction in diversification 
discount is positively related to the firms’ relationship with the bank.  This paper follows 
Lins and Servaes’ (1999) diversification discount measurement, which is similar to that 
of Berger and Ofek (1995).  Berger and Ofek(1995) define diversification discount 
(Discount) and multiplier estimation of imputed value, I(V), as follows: 
DISCOUNT = ln(V/I(V)),      (1) 
I(V) =  SALES∑
=
n
i 1
 i*(Indi(V/SALES)mf)    (2) 
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where 
DISCOUNT = firm’s diversification discount 
I(V) = imputed value of the sum of a firm’s segment as stand-alone          
   firms, 
SALESi  = segment i’s sales, 
Indi(V/SALES)mf = multiple of total capital to sales for the median single-segment     
      firm in segment i’s industry 
V = firm’s total capital (market value of common equity plus book  
   value of debt) 
n = total number of segments in segment i’s firm. 
Equation (1) shows that the firm’s diversification discount is the natural logarithm of the 
ratio of the firm’s actual value to its imputed value.  Equation (2) indicates that the firm’s 
imputed value is the sum of segment-imputed values, which are obtained by multiplying 
an industry median multiplier of total capital to sales by the segment’s level. 
Data and Sample Selection 
We collect the sample of Japanese corporate spin-offs announced from January 1, 
2001 through December 31, 2003 and completed since the effective date of the new 
corporate spin-offs law in April 2001.  The data source is Merger and Acquisition 
Research Report (MARR, Tokyo) published by RECOFF CO., which is the largest M&A 
data service provider in Japan.  MARR lists the announcement dates of spin-offs, names 
of parent and spun-off companies, and major industries of parent and spun-off companies.  
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In addition, we search for spin-off news in four major Japanese financial papers: Nihon 
Keizai Shimbun (Nikkei Economic Journal), Nihon Keizai Sangyo Shimbun (Nikkei 
Industrial Journal), Nihon Keizai Ryutuu Shimbun (Nikkei Distribution Journal), and 
Nihon Keizai Kinyuu Shimbun (Nikkei Finance Journal).  Bank-centered industrial groups, 
keiretsu, are identified from Industrial Groupings in Japan 2001, published by Dodwell 
Marketing Consultants.10  We restrict the sample to the firms listed in the First or the 
Second section of Tokyo Stock Exchange prior to the spin-off event year.11  We retrieve 
main bank information, bank ownership data, and consolidated bank loan amount data 
between 2000 and 2003 from the autumn issue of the Japan Company Handbook.  
Specific bank loan data and end-of-fiscal-year financial information are collected from 
the Nikkei Economic Electronic Databank System (NEEDS), Japan Company Handbook, 
and Worldscope.  These financial data are based on consolidated financial statements, 
which evaluate the performance of the business group as a whole, including spun-offs 
and related units.  Daily stock prices, as reflected in the daily Nikkei Average Index is 
retrieved from NEEDS.   
Initial spin-off data consisted of observations made between 2001 and 2003; we 
exclude merger-facilitated spin-offs.12  The sample also excludes 10 companies, 
including 6 real estate, 2 financial, and 2 utility companies. Additionally, 11 of the 
remaining samples are eliminated because they are related to firms spinning off more 
 
10 Hoshi et al. (1990 & 1991) use this publication for identifying the Keiretsu-affiliated firms. 
11 Japan Company Handbook contains the First and Second section of the Tokyo Stock Exchange’s listed 
firms’ firm specific information and financial data including name of the main bank, bank ownership, and 
bank loan amount data.  
12 For M&A facilitated spin-offs, we obtain the spin-offs completion dates, M&A completion dates, and 
new company’s name.   
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than one division.  Thus, the final sample includes 137 spin-off events. Table 1 describes 
the annual frequency of Japanese corporate spin-offs by keiretsu-affiliation of the parent 
firms.  The non-keiretsu-affiliated firms are more frequently involved in corporate spin-
offs during the sample period.  Also, the annual frequency of spin-offs increased 
significantly from 36 in the first year (2001) to 73 in 2002 and 52 in 2003. Using the 40 
MARR industry classifications, Table 2 shows the frequency of focus-increasing and 
non-focus-increasing spin-offs of parent companies by keiretsu-affiliation. If the parent 
company and its subsidiaries are in different industries, then the spin-off is considered to 
be focus-increasing.  It seems spin-offs are wide spread across different types of spin-offs 
without any noticeable patterns.  Table 3 shows the summary statistics of firm 
characteristics and bank governance variables.  Banks as a whole own about 20% of 
equity, while main banks own approximately 6% on average.  Almost 40% of the sample 
firms are affiliated with keiretsu.  Finally, about 62% of the sample firms have bank-
appointed directors. 
Empirical Results 
Announcement Abnormal Returns 
Table 4 shows the two-day average cumulative abnormal returns for parent firms around 
the spin-offs announcement.  The cumulative abnormal returns of spin-offs 
announcements are calculated based on the market model.  The market model parameters 
are estimated from 258 days to 11 days before the spin-offs announcement date, using the 
Nikkei 225 Stock Average Index as a market proxy.  The cumulative abnormal returns are 
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calculated around the announcement date window of (-1, 0).  On average, the whole 
sample shows 1.71% of positive abnormal returns at the 5% significance level.  Keiretsu-
affiliated spin-offs show 4.68% positive abnormal returns at the 1% significance level.  
However, non-keiretsu-affiliated spin-offs do not show significant abnormal returns. 
Both focus-increasing and non-focus-increasing spin-offs show 2.61% and 0.94% 
abnormal returns at the 1% and 10% significance level.  This is consistent with the focus-
increasing hypothesis that focus-increasing spin-offs have significant abnormal returns, 
higher than those of non-focus-increasing spin-offs.  Even the non-focus-increasing spin-
offs show significant positive returns, picked by the keiretsu-affiliated firms.  Therefore, 
the bank-centered industrial groups seem to play significant monitoring role in the pre-
spin-off stages in the Japanese corporate spin-off market.  The focus-increasing spin-offs 
by keiretsu-affiliated firms show the highest abnormal returns, 8.01%, which is consistent 
with the role of banks as efficient monitors.  
Table 5 shows the multivariate regression results, which are generated using two-
day cumulative abnormal returns around the spin-offs announcement as the dependent 
variable and firm-specific control variables and bank-relation variables as independent 
variables.  The regressions control for firm size, corporate focus, and profitability of the 
firms prior to the spin-offs announcements.  We measure firm size as the logarithm of the 
total asset, and we measure profitability as return on assets.  The focus-increasing dummy 
variable is one if the industry of the parent company is different from that of the spun-off 
firms. In model (1) of Table 5, we regress CARs against a keiretsu-affiliation dummy 
variable and the above mentioned control variables. There is a significant 6.4% of 
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difference in abnormal returns around announcement between keiretsu-affiliated and non-
keiretsu-affiliated firms at the 5% level.  In model (2) of Table 5, bank loan ration 
calculated as the bank loan normalized by the book value of total assets does not show 
any significant relationship to the abnormal returns, but the interaction variable with the 
bank-appointed director indicator variable is positively significant at the 10%.  This 
model indicates that the amount of bank debt may have monitoring impact through the 
bank-appointed director.  In model (3) of Table 5, we find that existence of a bank-
appointed director on the board results in the significantly higher CARs.  This indicates 
that bank-appointed directors seem to play significant monitoring roles in internal capital 
markets.  Model (4) of Table 5 indicates that the greatest impact on shareholder’s wealth 
is when firms have a keiretsu-affiliation and a bank-appointed director on the board.  This 
is not surprising given the previous results in model (2) and (3).  Unreported analysis 
shows that bank ownership is not significantly related to the announcement abnormal 
returns, but as it is shown in model (5) of Table 5, main bank ownership has a significant 
positive relationship with the abnormal return at the 10% significance level.  Therefore, 
the results suggest that simultaneous bank ownerships of both debt and equity claims 
seem to have significant effect on spin-offs abnormal returns.  In contrast with findings of 
Desai and Jain (1999), the focus-increasing dummy variable does not show any 
significant relationship with shareholder wealth change.  However, when the focus-
increasing spin-offs which are associated with the existence of a bank-appointed director 
or a keiretsu-affiliation, there is a significant positive relationship with announcement 
abnormal returns, shown in models (7) and (8) of Table 5.  In sum, the Japanese market 
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positively responds to spin-offs and reacts even more strongly when firms are linked with 
strong bank governance. 
Post-Spin-Offs Market-Adjusted Long-Term Abnormal Returns 
Table 6 shows the univariate analysis of average post-spin-offs market-adjusted 
abnormal returns and its significance of t-test.  After the spin-offs for 12 months, 24 
months, and 36 months, there are significant positive abnormal returns of 1.35%, 1.12%, 
and 0.94% respectively at the significance level of 1%.  The results indicate that the 
internal reorganization after spin-offs create value for shareholders in the long run.  We 
investigate whether the established relation between the shareholder wealth change 
during the announcements and bank-related variables still exist after spin-offs. 
 Table 7 shows the multivariate regression results, which are based on 12-months 
post-spin-offs market-adjusted abnormal returns as the dependent variable and firm-
specific control variables and bank-relation variables as independent variables. In model 
(1) of Table 7, keiretsu-affiliation does not show any significant difference in post-spin-
offs market-adjusted abnormal returns, but the interaction variable with Tobin’s Q below 
sample median indicator variable (Q-dummy) shows positive significant difference at the 
10% level.  In model (2) of Table 3, the result indicates that both bank loan amount and 
the interaction variable between bank loan amount and Q-dummy variable are 
significantly positively related to post-spin-offs market-adjusted abnormal returns at 10% 
and 1% each.  Models (3) and (4) report similar result as model (1), that is interaction 
variables between main bank loan amount and Q-dummy variable and the interaction 
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variable between bank-appointed director and Q-dummy variable are significantly 
positively related to post-spin-offs market-adjusted abnormal returns at 10% and 1%. 
Overall, there are significant positive relationships between the bank-related governance 
variables and the abnormal returns after spin-offs for the Q-dummy variable. This is 
consistent with Kang, Shivdasani, and Yamada (2000), who suggest that firms with poor 
investment opportunities (measured by Q) have greater benefit from closer ties with 
banks, who serve as informed creditors. 
Herfindahl Index as a Measure of Corporate Focus 
As shown in Panel A of Table 8, the difference between the Herfindahl index one 
year after and one year before spin-offs is shown to be significantly positive at the 5% 
significance level.  Panel B of Table 8 shows that the change in the Herfindahl index is 
significantly positively related to bank relationship variables. Model (1) in Panel B of 
Table 8 indicates that keiretsu-affiliation dummy variable has a significant positive 
relationship with the increase in the Herfindahl index at the 5% significance level.  Model 
(2) of the table shows that the interaction term between keiretsu-affiliation and bank loan 
has a significant positive relationship with the Herfindahl index change at the 1% 
significance level.  It can be interpreted that the firms with the stronger relationship with 
banks have the greater increase in the Herfindahl index. It is noteworthy that the 
Herfindahl index change is not associated with the focus-increasing dummy variable 
based on industries of parents and spin-offs, suggesting that these two alternative proxies 
for corporate focus actually do not pick up the same aspect of corporate focus. 
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Diversification Discount and Japanese Corporate Spin-offs 
We find that the diversification discounts in the Japanese firms are significantly 
reduced after the spin-offs.  Furthermore, the degree of reduction in diversification 
discount is positively related to the firms’ relationship with the bank.  Panel A of Table 9 
shows that the difference in the diversification discount between one year after and one 
year before spin-offs is significantly positive (t=2.3).  In Panel B of Table 9, the cross-
sectional regression results suggest that the degree of reductions in the diversification 
discount has a significant positive relationship with bank relationship variables.  Model 
(1) of Panel B shows that the loan amount from banks that have the ownership of the firm 
has a significant positive effect on the discount at the 1% significance level.  Also, model 
(2) of the table shows that the bank loan from the firm’s main bank with ownership has a 
significant positive relationship at the 1% level.  It can be interpreted that the firms with 
the closer relationship with banks result in higher reductions in the diversification 
discount.  In models (3) and (4), the analysis includes the interaction variable between the 
bank relationship and the Q-dummy variable.  The results of models (3) and (4) indicate 
that the monitoring role of banks in poorly performing firms is stronger in terms of 
reducing the diversification discount through spin-offs.  The results are also consistent 
with the results of models (1) and (2), which indicate that a stronger bank relationship 
creates a greater reduction of the diversification discount. 
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Conclusion 
We study the relationship between internal capital market and banks relationship 
by examining the Japanese corporate spin-offs from 2001 through 2003 since the 
establishment of new spin-offs law in Japan.  The Japanese spin-off data provide a unique 
environment in which we can focus on the effect of corporate restructurings on the 
efficiency of internal capital markets, not confronted by the control issues.  This study 
shows that there are significant positive abnormal returns around the announcement; 
significant positive market-adjusted returns after the spin-offs for 12, 24, and 36 months; 
a significant increase in focus of firms in terms of the Herfindahl index; and a significant 
reduction in the diversification discount.   
Announcement abnormal returns are positively related to the keiretsu-affiliation 
of firms, main bank ownership, and existence of a bank-appointed director.  Neither bank 
loan amount nor main bank loan amount are significantly related to the abnormal returns, 
but bank loan amount with the existence of bank-appointed directors have a significant 
positive relationship with the announcement abnormal returns.  Moreover, if the firm is 
keiretsu-affiliated and has directors appointed by banks, then the firm has significantly 
higher announcement returns than those affiliated only with keiretsu or with bank-
appointed directors.   
In contrast to previous studies, our study does not show significantly positive 
abnormal returns for focus-increasing spin-offs when corporate focus is measured based 
on industry differences. However, if the focus-increasing spin-offs are related to keiretsu-
affiliations or the existence of a bank-appointed director, then there are significantly 
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positive announcement abnormal returns.  The market-adjusted 12-months excess returns 
are significantly positively related to bank governance variables.  In addition, we show 
evidence that under-performing firms benefit more from closer ties with banks than those 
who are not closely tied with banks.  Also, the degree of increase in the Herfindahl index 
is significantly positively related to bank relationship.  Finally, the corporate spin-offs in 
Japan seem to significantly reduce the diversification discount, and the degree of its 
reduction is positively related to the bank relationship with firms.  
 Our empirical evidence suggests that there is a significant relationship between 
internal capital market and banks in Japan; the closer relationship with banks creates 
shareholder wealth, increases the focus of firms, and reduces diversification discounts 
after the internal capital market reorganization through spin-offs. 
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TABLES 
Table 1 Annual Frequency of Japanese Spin-off and Keiretsu-Affiliations
This table lists the annual frequency of the Japanese spin-offs of listed firms in our sample, categorized by 
the keiretsu-affiliation of the firms.  The sample includes the finance, real estate, and utility companies, 
which we excluded for our analysis.  Keiretsu-affiliation information is retrieved from Industrial 
Groupings in Japan 2001.
 
Year Keiretsu Affiliated 
Firms 
Non-Keiretsu Affiliated Total 
2001 12 24 36 
2002 29 44 73 
2003 18 34 52 
Total 59 102 161 
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Table 2 Number of Japanese Spin-offs by Keiretsu-affiliation Indication, and Focus-
increasing Indication Variables from 2001 through 2003 
This table summarizes the number of the Japanese spin-offs announced from January 1, 2001 through 
December 31, 2003 excluding the finance, utility, and real estate companies, categorized by keiretsu-
affiliation and focus-increasing indicator variables.  Keiretsu-affiliation information is retrieved from 
Industrial Groupings in Japan 2001. Focus-increasing dummy variable is indicated as focus-increasing if 
the industry of spun-off firms is different froms that of the parent company’s major industry.  There are 40 
industries which are categorized by MARR (Merger & Acquisition Resource Report) 
 
       Focus
  Increasing Non-
Increasing
Total
 Affiliated 25 31 56 
Keiretsu-Affiliation Non-Affiliated 44 51 95 
 Total 69 82 151 
39 
  
Table 3 Summary Statistics of Pre-spin-offs for Japanese Spin-offs 
This table provides the summary statistics of Japanese spin-offs samples listed in the First and Second 
section of Tokyo Stock Exchange, which are announced from January 1, 2001 through December 31st, 
2003 and completed since effective date of the new corporate spin-offs law, April 1, 2001. The sample of 
Japanese corporate spin-offs are obtained from MARR (Merger and Acquisition Research Report, Tokyo) 
published by REOCFF CO., which is the largest M&A data service in Japan.  Cumulative abnormal returns 
are calculated from market model estimated from days -258 to -11 relative to the press announcement. 
  
 
Variables 
 
Mean 
 
Median 
Standard 
Deviation 
Total Assets (billions of yen) 669421 80175 1517245 
Sales (billions of yen) 610139 88443 1369816 
Bank Loan to Total Asset Ratio .30133 .314865 .19968 
Bank Ownership 19.7589 19.9 11.0011 
Main Bank Ownership 6.17 5.60 4.182 
Proportion of Firms in keiretsu-affiliation 38.8 - - 
Proportion of Firms has Bank-Appointed 
Director 
62.2 - - 
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Table 4 Two-Day (-1,0) Average Cumulative Abnormal Returns of Japanese 
Keiretsu-Affiliated Spin-offs, and Focus-Increasing Spin-offs 
This table summarizes the market-adjusted two day cumulative abnormal returns of Japanese spin-offs 
samples listed in the First and Second section of Tokyo Stock Exchange, which are announced the spin-offs 
from January 1st, 2001 through December 31st, 2003 and completed the spin-offs since effective date of 
new corporate spin-offs law in April of 2001.  Cumulative abnormal returns are calculated from market 
model estimated from days -258 to -11 relative to the press announcement.  Mean cumulative abnormal 
returns and the p-values are reported in the parentheses under the mean.  
 
            
  Focus-Increase Non- 
Focus-Increase
Total
  
Keiretsu-Affiliated
.0801 *** 
(.000) 
.019 ** 
(.0128) 
.0468 *** 
(.000) 
 Non- 
Keiretsu-Affiliated
-.0075 
(.3174) 
.0033 
(.6744) 
-.0015 
(.7794) 
  
Total
.0261 *** 
(.000) 
.0094 * 
(.0782) 
.0171 ** 
(.016) 
 
*,**, and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels respectively. 
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Table 5 Cross-Sectional Analysis of Two-Day Cumulative Abnormal Returns for 
Japanese Spin-offs 
This table summarizes the regression analysis with market-adjusted two day cumulative abnormal returns 
as dependent variables and bank-related governance variable as independent variable of Japanese spin-offs 
samples we collected.  Bank-centered industrial groups, keiretsu, are identified from Industrial Groupings 
in Japan 2001 published by Dodwell Marketing Consultants. We retrieve main bank information, bank 
ownership, and consolidated bank loan data from autumn versions of Japan Company Handbook between 
2000 and 2003.  Specific bank loan data and end of fiscal year financial data is collected from Nikkei 
Economic Electronic Databank System (NEEDS), Japan Company Handbook, and Worldscope.  These 
financial data are based on consolidated financial statements, which evaluate the performance of the 
business group as a whole, including spun-offs and related units.  Bank-sent director variable is collected 
from year 2000 version through 2003 version of Yakuinshikiho(Toyo Keizain Shimposha).  Daily stock 
price of firms, and daily Nikkei Average Index are retrieved from Nikkei Economic Electronic Databank 
System (NEEDS).  The numbers in parentheses are p-values for two-tailed test.  
*,**, and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels respectively. 
Independent Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Log of Total Asset -.010 
(.125) 
.327 
(.327) 
-.006 
(.324) 
-.011* 
(.078) 
.000 
(.981) 
.001 
(.877) 
-.003 
(.572) 
-.007 
(.272) 
Focus Increasing Dummy .014 
(.565) 
.014 
(.606) 
.016 
(.533) 
.025 
(.291) 
-.004 
(.821) 
.000 
(.990) 
-.024 
(.476) 
-.023 
(.402) 
Return on Asset 
 
-.147 
(-.149) 
-.134 
(.227) 
-.179* 
(.087) 
-.111 
(.266) 
-.106* 
(.079) 
-.096* 
(.097) 
-.166 
(.105) 
-.156 
(.121) 
Keiretsu Dummy 
 
.064** 
(.025) 
       
Bank Loan to Total Asset  -.024 
(.794) 
      
Bank-Appointed Director   .051* 
(.060) 
     
Keiretsu Dummy × Bank 
Sent Director Dummy 
   .101*** 
(.001) 
    
Main Bank Ownership     .003* 
(.068) 
   
Bank Loan to Total Asset × 
Bank-Appointed  Director 
Dummy 
 .135* 
(.091) 
      
Main Bank Ownership × 
Bank Sent Director Dummy 
     .004*** 
(.006) 
  
Focus Increasing Dummy × 
Bank-Appointed  Director 
Dummy 
      .070* 
(.077) 
 
Focus Increasing Dummy ×  
Keiretsu Dummy 
       .096** 
(.013) 
 
Adjusted R2 
 
.043 
 
.033 
 
.036 
 
.090 
 
.026 
 
.066 
 
.033 
 
.052 
Number of observations 
 
N =134 N = 122 N = 122 N = 134 N = 113 N = 120 N = 129 N=134 
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Table 6 Post-spin-offs Market-Adjusted Excess Returns of Japanese Spin-offs 
This table summarizes the post-spin-off performance of Japanese spin-offs. Post-spin-offs market-adjusted 
excess returns for 3-, 6-, 12-, 24-, 36-months are calculated for Japanese spin-offs completed from 2001 
through 2004.  Market-adjusted excess returns are defined as average difference between firm’s monthly 
compounded returns and monthly compounded monthly Nikkei index.  Mean market-adjusted excess 
returns and the p-value of t-tests are reported in the parentheses under the mean.  The sample excludes 
some recent events because our data set is limited up to September of 2004.  P-values from t-tests are 
reported in parentheses below the mean and p-values from sign-rank tests are reported in parentheses below 
the median. 
Post Spin-offs 3 months 6 months 12 months 24 months 36 months 
 
Total 
.5586% 
(0.495) 
.7341% 
(0.118) 
1.3505%*** 
(0.000) 
1.1124%*** 
(0.000) 
0.9385%*** 
(.002) 
 -0.4880% 
(.2176) 
N = 129 
0.1120% 
(0.4662) 
N=129 
0.7960%*** 
(0.000) 
N=125 
0.9568%*** 
(0.000) 
N=70 
0.8603%*** 
(0.0018) 
N=22 
 
Keiretsu-affiliated 
0.0024 
(0.1095) 
-0.0143** 
(0.0120) 
N=49 
0.0067 
(0.3648) 
-0.00132 
(0.8255) 
N=49 
0.0144** 
(0.0155) 
0.0098*** 
(0.0006) 
N=49 
0.0095*** 
(0.0037) 
0.0064*** 
(0.0009) 
N=26 
0.0071 
(0.1794) 
0.0032 
(0.2969) 
N=7 
 
Non- keiretsu-
affiliated 
0.00859 
(0.3436) 
-0.00203 
(0.9130) 
N=80 
0.0088 
(0.1508) 
0.0026 
(0.5764) 
N=80 
0.0133*** 
(0.0049) 
0.0071*** 
(0.0073) 
N=76 
0.0124*** 
(0.0001) 
0.0101 
(0.0001)*** 
N=44 
0.0092** 
(0.0125) 
0.0104** 
(0.0151) 
N=15 
 
Focus-Increasing 
-0.0015 
(0.8846) 
-0.0100 
(0.2783) 
N=56 
0.0115* 
(0.0760) 
0.0016 
(0.2436) 
N=56 
0.0167*** 
(0.0004) 
0.0109 
(0.0001)*** 
N=54 
0.0141*** 
(0.0001) 
0.0130*** 
(0.0001) 
N=31 
0.0126** 
(0.0123) 
0.0138** 
(0.0371) 
N=10 
 
Non-Focus-
Increasing 
0.0122 
(0.3130) 
-0.0023 
0.0054 
(0.4235) 
0.0018 
0.0114** 
(0.0358) 
0.0057** 
0.0091*** 
(0.0021) 
0.0064*** 
0.0051 
(0.1349) 
0.0048 
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(0.8554) 
N=73 
(0.7543) 
N=73 
(0.0240) 
N=71 
(0.0009) 
N=39 
(0.1294) 
N=12 
 
Existence of 
Bank-Appointed 
Director 
0.01383 
(0.2884) 
-0.0024 
(0.9978) 
N=73 
0.0103 
(0.1392) 
0.0018 
(0.4601) 
N=73 
0.0151*** 
(0.0059) 
0.0085*** 
(0.0024) 
N=71 
0.0083*** 
(0.0037) 
0.0054*** 
(0.0026) 
N=38 
0.0016 
(0.6418) 
-0.0009 
(0.9219) 
N=10 
 
Non-Existence of 
Bank-Appointed 
Director 
-0.0081 
(0.3821) 
-0.0049 
(0.2203) 
N=45 
0.0036 
(0.6233) 
-0.0017 
(0.8460) 
N=45 
0.0136** 
(0.0348) 
0.0095*** 
(0.0012) 
N=43 
0.0153*** 
(0.0001) 
0.0130*** 
(0.0001) 
N=28 
0.0154*** 
(0.0003) 
0.0145*** 
(0.0005) 
N=13 
*,**, and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels respectively. 
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Table 7 Cross-Sectional Analysis of 12-months Market-Adjusted Post-spin-offs 
Returns for Japanese Spin-offs 
Post-spin-offs market-adjusted excess returns for12-months are calculated for Japanese spin-offs completed 
from 2001 through 2004.  Market-adjusted excess returns are defined as average difference between firm’s 
monthly compounded returns and monthly compounded monthly Nikkei index.  Mean market-adjusted 
excess returns and the p-values are reported in the parentheses under the mean.  The sample excludes some 
recent events, because our data set is limited up to September of 2004.  Tobin’s Q dummy variable 
indicates whether the firm’s Tobin’s Q is below sample median. 
 
 
 Independent Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Log of Total Asset -.004* 
(.074) 
-.004** 
(.029) 
-.001 
(.461) 
-.001 
(.764) 
Focus-Increasing Dummy .004 
(.555) 
.002 
(.726) 
-.007 
(.456) 
.004 
(.613) 
Return on Asset 
 
.009 
(.769) 
.023 
(.441) 
-.013 
(.679) 
.009 
(.752) 
Keiretsu Dummy 
 
.001 
(.949) 
   
Keiretsu Dummy × Tobin Q Dummy .022* 
(.060) 
   
 
Bank Loan Ratio 
  
.034* 
(.098) 
  
Bank Loan to Total Asset × Tobin Q 
Dummy 
 .057*** 
(.004) 
  
 
Main Bank Loan Ratio 
   
.000 
(.947) 
 
Main Bank Loan to Total Asset × 
Tobin Q Dummy 
  .139* 
(.059) 
 
 
Bank-Sent Director Dummy 
    
-.010 
(.235) 
Bank-Sent Director Dummy ×  
Tobin Q Dummy 
   .039*** 
(.000) 
Adjusted R2 
 
.027 .118 .011 .127 
Number of observations 
 
N=125 N =125 N =81 N =114 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*,**,and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels respectively. 
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Table 8 Univariate and Cross-Sectional Analysis of Herfindahl Index Changes from 
Pre- to Post-spin-offs in Japan 
Herfindahl index measures degree of firm’s focus.  Herfindahl index is calculated as the sum of squares of 
each segment’s sales as a proportion of total sales. P-values from sign-rank tests are reported in parentheses 
below the median and p-values from t-tests are reported in parentheses below the mean. 
Panel A. T-test
N Min. Max. Median Mean 
98 -.2663 .6469 .0046** 
(0.0356) 
.02029** 
(0.044) 
*,**, and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels respectively. 
Panel B. Cross-Sectional Analysis
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Independent Variables (1) (2) 
Log of Total Asset -.011* 
(.067) 
-.011** 
(..049) 
Focus-Increasing Dummy .020 
(.338) 
.021 
(.302) 
Return on Asset 
 
.057 
(.513) 
.087 
(.329) 
Keiretsu Dummy 
 
.049* 
(.053) 
 
Bank Loan to Total Asset  -.045 
(.473) 
Keiretsu Dummy ×  Bank Loan to Total Asset  .168*** 
(.006) 
Adjusted R2 
 
.014 .075 
Number of observations N=93 N =93 
*, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels respectively. 
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Table 9 Univariate and Cross-Sectional Analysis of Diversification Discount 
Changes from Pre- to Post-spin-offs in Japan 
Diversification discount calculation follows Lins and Servaes (1999), which is similar to that of Berger and 
Ofek (1995).  Bank loan with ownership is the amount of bank debt obtained from banks which have the 
ownership of the firm.  Similarly, main bank loan with ownership is the amount of bank debt obtained from 
main banks which have the ownership of the firm. P-values from sign-rank tests are reported in parentheses 
below the median and p-values from t-tests are reported in parentheses below the mean. 
 
Panel A. T-test
N Min. Max. Median Mean 
54 -1.10 8.85 .2114*** 
(0.0026) 
.6509** 
(0.025) 
 
Panel B. Cross-Sectional Analysis 
 
Independent Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Log of Total Asset .121 
(.214) 
.151 
(.137) 
.131 
(.425) 
.116 
(.503) 
Focus-Increasing Dummy -.163 
(.653) 
-.455 
(.202) 
-.584 
(.361) 
-.828 
(.220) 
Return on Asset 
 
-.570 
(.575) 
-.539 
(.570) 
2.454 
(.233) 
2.653 
(.197) 
Bank Loan with Ownership to 
Total Asset 
9.624*** 
(.000) 
   
Main Bank Loan with Ownership 
to Total Asset 
 12.827*** 
(.000) 
  
 
Tobin Q 
 
  3.557*** 
(.009) 
3.826*** 
(.006) 
Bank Loan with Ownership to 
Total Asset  × Tobin Q Below 
Sample Median Dummy 
  10.043*** 
(.006) 
 
Main Bank Loan with Ownership 
to Total Asset   × Tobin Q Below 
Sample Median Dummy 
   13.6*** 
(.001) 
Adjusted R2 
 
.315 .527  .217 
Number of observations 
 
N=43 N =39 N = 51 N =47 
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STUDY TWO 
INTERNAL CAPITAL MARKETS, INVESTMENT, AND BANK 
RELATIONSHIP 
- EVIDENCE FROM JAPANESE CORPORATE SPIN-OFFS 
 
In conjunction with the internal capital market literature, studies on spin-offs 
analyze how firms increase the efficiency of internal capital markets after spin-off 
transactions.  Spin-offs allow us to examine changes in the efficiency of internal capital 
markets because firms’ capital is reallocated through spin-offs.  Unlike other divestitures 
such as equity carve-outs or asset sales, spin-offs do not generate cash for the parent and 
the spun-off company.  Because of the non-cash-generating features, spin-offs provide a 
well-furnished natural experimental setting for internal capital market analysis.  
Literature on internal capital markets (e.g., Gertner et al., 2002; Dittmar and Shivdasani, 
2003; Ahn and Denis, 2004) shows that spin-offs improve the investment efficiency.13  
Most recently, Choi and Han (2005) show that internal capital markets in Japan become 
more efficient after spin-offs.14   
In this study, we examine the investment efficiency changes in Japanese 
companies after corporate spin-offs.  In addition, we investigate whether banks monitor 
the spin-offs’ transactions during the restructuring to increase the efficiency of internal 
capital markets.  Our main contributions are three-fold.  The first is due to the uniqueness 
                                                 
13 Gertner et al. (2002) show an increase in investment sensitivity after spin-offs using spun-off division 
data.  Dittmar and Shivdasani (2003) examine the effect of divestitures in investment of parent firms, and 
Ahn and Denis (2004) study the changes of investment policy for the combined firm of parent and spun-off 
companies.   
14 Specifically, they show significant positive abnormal returns around the announcements, excess returns 
after the spin-offs, increases of Herfindahl index, and reduction in the diversification discount after the 
spin-offs.  Also, these variables are significantly positively related to bank-related governance variables 
such as keiretsu-affiliation, bank loan amount, main bank ownership, and existence of bank-appointed 
director variables. 
  
of the Japanese spin-off structure in which a division becomes a new subsidiary but still 
remains under the control of the parent company.  Thus, its overall governance structure 
does not change.  This has an important implication for the study of internal capital 
markets because these restructurings are purely internally executed transactions, which 
are different from what is commonly thought of as a spin-off.  Thus, we can examine the 
effect of corporate restructurings on the efficiency of internal capital markets without 
changing the ownership and control structure.  Our empirical setting complements that of 
Ahn and Denis (2004),15 which combines the investment efficiency of the parent and the 
spin-off companies.  This study confirms the findings of previous internal capital markets 
literature, which find that internal restructuring through spin-offs increases the efficiency 
of internal capital markets.   
Second, this investigation extends the studies on Japanese deregulation that has 
been implemented in the last two decades.  The new corporate spin-off law is the end-
result of recent Japanese capital market deregulation and Commercial Code revisions in 
the late 1990s and the early 2000s.  These laws initiated the simplified spin-off 
procedures, using simplified merger procedures and stock transfer systems.16
The data of this study covers the deregulation time period of the year 2001 
through the year 2003, which has not been examined yet in the literature.  Anderson and 
Makhija (1999), Wu and Xu (2005), and Kato et al. (2006) have also investigated the 
effect of financial deregulation in Japan using data from the 1980s, 1974-1997, and 1997-
                                                 
15 Ahn and Denis’ (2004) empirical setting complements that of Gertner et al. (2002) and Dittmar and 
Shivdasani (2003), because they use the combined data of parent and spin-offs.   
16 These procedures will be elaborated on in Section 3. 
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2001 respectively.  Our study investigates one of the deregulatory issues in the “Big 
Bang,” which started in 1998 and finished in the spring of 2001. 
Third, this study complements the Japanese banking literature.17  It is well known 
that the Japanese corporate structure is governed by a bank-centered relationship.  Thus, 
the Japanese spin-offs dataset provides a unique setting that can test the impact of the 
bank relationship on internal capital markets.  Diamond (1984, 1991), among others, 
argues that banks monitor their client firms and the delegated monitoring reduces the 
information asymmetry between the firms and the capital markets.  Our study provides 
evidence of the monitoring role of Japanese banks in the investment behavior of internal 
capital markets, and shows results consistent with Kang, Shivdasani, and Yamada (2000), 
among others.  
We find that investment sensitivity in Japanese companies increases significantly 
after internal restructurings through spin-offs, consistent with Gertner et al. (2002).  
Unlike other studies (Gertner et al., 2002; Dittmar and Shivdasani, 2003), we show that 
the related spin-offs show a significant increase of investment sensitivity after being 
spun-off.  Furthermore, we find that banks’ monitoring function seems to increase 
investment efficiency.  Examining the bank-related governance structure in Japan, 
including keiretsu-affiliation, main bank ownership, and amount of bank loan, we show 
that bank-related spin-offs’ investments are more sensitive to investment opportunities, 
Tobin’s Q.  We find that keiretsu-affiliated firms’ spin-offs increase investment 
sensitivity after being spun-off.  Also, spin-offs with low Qs and high bank loans 
                                                 
17 See Choi and Han (2005) for details on Japanese banking literature. 
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experience a significant increase in investment sensitivity, probably because of greater 
incentives for banks to monitor them, as argued by Kang et al. (2000).  This result is also 
consistent with Khanna and Palepu’s findings (2000) that the internal capital market for 
Indian business-group-affiliated firms is more efficient compared to that of non-affiliated 
firms.  Hoshi et al. (1990, 1991) suggest that keiretsu-affiliated firms are not as liquidity 
constrained as non-affiliated firms and hence can be more efficient in investment policy.  
Thus, we suggest that banks play such a role in internal capital markets to ensure efficient 
investment decisions of the firms.   
The rest of the paper is structured as follows.  In Section 2, we provide the 
background on the Japanese financial deregulations and spin-offs.  In Section 3, we 
discuss the hypotheses and methodology.  In Section 4, we describe the data and 
descriptive statistics of Japanese corporate spin-offs and discuss the empirical results.  
Section 5 summarizes and concludes the paper. 
Japanese Financial Deregulation and Internal Capital Markets Restructuring 
The Japanese economy and financial markets have been stumbling for the last 
decade after the collapse of the bubble economy in the late 1980s.  Since then, to 
reinvigorate the economy, the Japanese government has tried a wide range of 
deregulations through numerous revisions of the Commercial Codes.  This section 
summarizes the process of recent financial deregulation in Japan, focusing on the 
Commercial Codes revisions.  Then we anchor our study on Japanese corporate spin-offs 
as the extension of Japanese deregulation literature. 
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  In Japan, the most important factor directly influencing the financial system and 
corporate governance is the existing Commercial Codes revised by governmental, 
academic, and corporate entities.  In 1950, the Commercial Codes were revised 
dramatically to separate ownership and management.  After the revisions in the 1950, the 
Commercial Codes were revised every several years. 
Among the recent Japanese financial deregulations through Commercial Codes 
revisions, in the mid-1980s, the standards for bond issuance were liberalized through 
deregulation acceleration.  As a result of this deregulation, many Japanese firms could 
decrease their heavy dependence on bank financing and select debt capital.  Anderson 
and Makhija’s (1999) study of Japanese firms in the late 1980s, which investigated the 
choice of monitored bank financing and arm’s-length public bond, suggests that 
monitored bank financing provides benefits to firms compared to the public debt with 
high agency costs.  Along with this study, Wu and Xu (2005) studied a sample of 
Japanese firms during 1974-1997, finding adverse keiretsu-effects in the 1980s, while the 
adverse value effect diminished in the 1990s, when heavy burdens of capital market 
regulation on the public debt market were removed: “This evidence presages the waning 
of traditional keiretsu practices, along with the main-bank-centered governance and 
finance structure” (Wu and Xu 2005).   
The deregulation did not stop even when the Japanese economy was in the most 
serious recession after the Asian financial crisis in 1998-99.  The “Big Bang” 
deregulation of the Japanese financial market started in 1998 through Commercial Codes 
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amendments.  The amendments enhanced flexibility in the financial markets:18 stock 
options provisions, mergers, and internal capital market reorganizations.  The stock 
options provisions amendments allowed the issuance of stock options for employees, 
including executives.  Kato et al. (2006) study the shareholder wealth effect of 350 firms 
that adopted option-based compensation plans between 1997 and 2001, and they find that 
good incentive-based compensation plans create shareholder value.  In 1997, merger 
procedures were simplified, and the Revision of the Anti-monopoly Law allowed 
establishment of pure holding companies, banned since 1947.  In 1999, in conjunction 
with the simplified merger procedures and Anti-monopoly Law, the stock swap system 
and stock transfer system were created to facilitate the transactions between wholly-
owned subsidiaries and their parent companies.  The 2000 Amendment of the 
Commercial Codes introduced the procedures for company split-up to make restructuring 
through spin-offs or divestitures easier.  
We extend the studies on the relationship between Japanese corporate governance 
and Japanese deregulations using the Japanese spin-offs data between 2001 and 2003.  
On April 1, 2001, the new spin-off laws went into effect, and many Japanese firms 
became involved in spin-offs for their corporate restructurings.  The new spin-off laws 
are the end-result of the Commercial Code revisions of the Japanese capital market in the 
late 1990s and the early 2000s.  Thus, the various revisions relating to stock repurchases, 
                                                 
18 Milaupt (2003) divides the amendments into two groups.  One group might be called flexibility 
enhancing amendments.  These Code changes expand corporate finance options and increase organizational 
flexibility for Japanese firms in the areas of stock options, mergers, and corporate reorganizations.  A 
second group might be called monitoring enhancing amendments.  These Code amendments include 
changes to the shareholder derivative suit mechanism and statutory auditor system as well as reforms to the 
corporate board structure. 
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holding companies, and simplified mergers and spin-offs have not only brought the legal 
framework more in tune with the demands of Japan’s internationalized capital markets, 
but have also made the management of Japanese corporations more conscious of 
corporate value.19  Thus, this study investigates the effect of Japanese financial 
deregulation after the year 2001 using corporate spin-offs data that has not been 
examined yet.  
Around the time of the Asian financial crisis at the end of the 1990s, the Japanese 
government and corporations started to realize the need for corporate reorganizations, 
such as spin-offs or other divestitures, to improve the flexibility and efficiency of their 
corporate structures in the competitive international capital market.  The institutional 
legal frame of Japanese corporate spin-offs began to change in 1997, and many of the 
Japanese multi-divisional firms reorganized their internal capital markets by transforming 
divisions into independent units such as wholly-owned subsidiaries or spin-offs to obtain 
optimal internal capital market structures.  Before the enactment of the new corporate 
spin-off laws in April 2001, Japanese firms were required to be inspected by the federal 
court before conducting spin-offs.  They also needed to obtain individual approval from 
creditors for the transfer of liabilities and assets, which impeded flexible corporate 
restructuring.  However, the procedure has been simplified since the new Commercial 
Codes revision in 2001.  In the past, cash transactions were required, but the new law 
allowed easier transactions without cash, accompanied by the stock swap and stock 
transfer systems changes in 1999.  Consequently, it became easier for firms to choose 
                                                 
19 Japan Investor Relations and Investor Support, Inc. Research Newsletter, Issue No.1, December 2001 
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their optimal corporate structure, setting the stage for implementing the new corporate 
spin-off laws in Japan. 
Hypotheses and Methodology 
Hypotheses: Investment and Bank Relationship 
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Gertner, Power, and Scharfstein (2002) show that spin-offs improve the efficiency 
of capital allocation through spin-offs; these results are found primarily in the industries 
where the parent and spin-off firms are unrelated and in spin-offs where announcement 
returns are higher.  Desai and Jain (1999) find that both the announcement period and 
long-run abnormal returns for the focus-increasing spin-offs are significantly larger than 
those for non-focus-increasing spin-offs.  Dittmar and Shivdasani (2003) show that 
divestiture reduces the diversification discount and increases the efficiency of segment 
investment, suggesting that inefficient investment is partly responsible for the 
diversification discount and supporting the corporate focus and financing hypothesis. 
 Furthermore, we estimate equation (1) by dividing the sample into sub-samples 
based on the characteristics of the spin-offs: related and unrelated, and regular and 
merger-facilitated spin-offs.  The related spin-offs create an independent, related business 
unit within the conglomerate.  Berger and Ofek (1995) argue that diversified firms with 
unrelated businesses are less efficient.  Therefore, we expect that related spin-offs 
significantly increase investment sensitivity after being spun off.  On the other hand, 
unrelated spin-offs diversify the conglomerate by creating independent, unrelated 
businesses.  However, even if unrelated spin-offs diversify the conglomerate, division 
  
managers become more independent from the parent company and have greater 
incentives to increase investment efficiency.  Therefore, unrelated spin-offs’ net effect of 
diversification is not clear in the efficiency of the overall conglomerate.  
There are three major bank-oriented Japanese corporate governance systems: 1) a 
bank-centered group called keiretsu, 2) bank ownership of firms, and 3) main bank.  
Keiretsu 20 is a bank-centered, long-term transactional relationship that closely monitors 
client firms; keiretsu, the bank-centered group, is linked by “stable inter-corporate 
shareholding”21 between firms (Morck and Nakamura, 1999).  Thus, bank-related 
Japanese corporate governance enhances the unique equity ownership structure, which is 
cross shareholdings between industrial firms and banks.22  Hoshi et al. (1990) find that 
the insurance and monitoring roles are more evident with keiretsu-affiliated firms.  
Therefore, we expect that investment sensitivity under keiretsu-affiliation would be 
greater than under non-keiretsu affiliation.   
Equity ownership of industrial firms by Japanese banks is unique to the Japanese 
governance system, while equity ownership by banks is limited in the United States.  
Morck et al. (2000) study the relationship between main bank ownership and firm value 
in Japan, arguing that bank ownership increases firm value only when the banks and 
shareholders are closely aligned in incentives.  In particular, they examine main banks’ 
dual ownership of debt and equity claims; this dual ownership measures the degree of 
                                                 
20 There are eight horizontal industrial groups in Japan: Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Sumitomo, Sanwa, Dai-Ichi 
Kangyo Bank, Fuyo, Tokai, and Industrial Bank of Japan.  
21 Morck and Nakamura (1999) define ‘stable shareholders’ as those who almost never sell out and 
consistently support management. 
22 Morck, Nakamura, and Shivdasani (2000) explain the origins of Japanese bank ownership in detail. 
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alignment of interests between debt and equity holders.  The main banks are typically the 
major lenders to firms, and play the role of information controller and monitor of the firm, 
intervening in financing and investment decisions.  Hoshi et al. (1990) find that firms 
with a close relation with main banks are less liquidity constrained.  Also, main banks 
organize rescue programs when their client firms become financially distressed, and this 
insurance role leads them to monitor the firm more closely.  Kang and Shivdasani (1995) 
find that poorly performing firms are more likely associated with higher CEO turnovers 
when firms have a close relationship with main banks.  
Morck et al. (2000) find that there is a non-linear relationship between main bank 
ownership and firm value, showing that at low levels of ownership by main banks, firm 
value decreases as ownership increases, and the opposite is shown sometimes at higher 
levels.  Banks as creditors may act against maximizing shareholder wealth; low-to-
moderate ownership may empower banks to expropriate shareholder wealth.  However, 
with high levels of bank ownership, the adverse incentive is mitigated and the positive 
effect of monitoring kicks in.  Thus, we expect that investment efficiency increases at a 
high level of main bank ownership. 
Finally, Kang et al. (2000) show that there is a significant positive relationship 
between the announcement returns of Japanese mergers and the loan amount from bank 
and main bank.  They suggest that Japanese banks, as debt holders, perform an important 
monitoring function.  We examine whether the bank loan amount affects our investment 
model.  We do not have main bank loan amounts due to the lack of the bank-specific loan 
amount of each sample.  Thus, we use the overall bank loan amount as a proxy for banks’ 
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monitoring incentives.  Thus, we hypothesize that banks’ monitoring function affects the 
increase in investment efficiency of internal capital markets.  
Methodology 
Our empirical model is similar to that of Gertner et al.’s (2002).  Scaled capital 
expenditures are regressed on Q in our investment model.  Our estimation is based on the 
panel framework of years -2, -1, +1, and +2 before and after spin-offs transactions.  We 
exclude the spin-offs’ year, because it overlaps the periods of pre- and post-spin-offs.  
The basic empirical model is as follows: 
IKit = αi + β1*Qit + β2*Qit*AFTER + β2*AFTER + ∑tγt*YEARt + εit.    (1) 
In equation (1), IKit is the ratio of capital expenditures to the book value of total assets for 
firm i at time t.  AFTER is a dummy variable indicating the post-spin-off time period of 
+1 and +2 as one and zero otherwise.  Qit is a proxy of investment opportunities for firm i 
at time t.  YEARt is a calendar dummy variable of fiscal year t, which controls for the 
specific year effect.  Qit*AFTER is the interaction term to check if there is any significant 
increase in investment sensitivity after spin-offs transactions.  Our main focus is on the 
coefficient estimate of the interaction term. In general, we expect a significant positive 
β2—the coefficient of the interaction term between Tobin’s Q and the AFTER dummy 
variable in equation (1)—if the investment efficiency of internal capital markets increases 
through spin-offs.  As discussed in Section 1, it is worthwhile to note that unlike other 
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studies,23 our data make it convenient to compare pre- and post-spin-off events to 
examine the overall effect of the spin-offs because the consolidated financial data is 
available before and after spin-offs. In the following, we examine the estimation results 
of the above investment model under various specifications based on bank governance 
and spin-off-specific variables. 
In estimation, we choose to employ the random effect model instead of the fixed 
effect one.  Zhou (2001) argues that the fixed effect model cannot detect an effect of 
ownership on performance, considering a firm as a time variant entity allowing within- 
variation rather than an invariant one.  Therefore, we also use the random effect model 
because firm-specific effects such as governance or board structures are not fixed but are 
dynamic over time, especially during our estimation period.24  In Japan, during the 
sample period of this study, many deregulations were in active progress.  For example, 
the Commercial Code amendment of 2002 exercised board reforms which allowed a 
U.S.-style committee system for corporate governance.  Therefore, based on Zhou’s 
(2001) argument and actual Japanese regulation-specific effects on Japanese firm 
dynamics, it is reasonable to use the random effect model for our analysis. 
                                                 
23 Gertner et al. (2002), Dittmar and Shivdasani (2003), and Ahn and Denis (2004). 
24 We checked the Hausman test and results are mixed by different model estimation.  Thus, we chose the 
random effect model based on Zhou’s (2001) argument.  
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Data and Empirical Analysis 
Data and Sample Selection 
We collected the sample of Japanese corporate spin-offs announced from January 
1, 2001 through December 31, 2003 and completed since the effective date of the new 
corporate spin-offs law in April 2001.  The data source is Merger and Acquisition 
Research Report (MARR, Tokyo) published by RECOFF CO., which is the largest M&A 
data service provider in Japan.  MARR lists the announcement dates of spin-offs, names 
of parent and spun-off companies, and major industries of parent and spun-off companies.  
In addition, we searched for spin-off news in four major Japanese financial papers: Nihon 
Keizai Shimbun (Nikkei Economic Journal), Nihon Keizai Sangyo Shimbun (Nikkei 
Industrial Journal), Nihon Keizai Ryutuu Shimbun (Nikkei Distribution Journal), and 
Nihon Keizai Kinyuu Shimbun (Nikkei Finance Journal).  Bank-centered industrial groups, 
keiretsu, are identified from Industrial Groupings in Japan 2001, published by Dodwell 
Marketing Consultants.25  We restricted the sample to the firms listed in the First or the 
Second Section of Tokyo Stock Exchange prior to the spin-off event year.26  We retrieved 
main bank information, bank ownership data, and consolidated bank loan amount data 
from the autumn issue of Japan Company Handbook between 2000 and 2003.  Specific 
bank-loan data and end-of-fiscal-year financial information were collected from Nikkei 
Economic Electronic Databank System (NEEDS), Japan Company Handbook, and 
                                                 
25 Hoshi et al. (1990, 1991) use this for identifying the keiretsu-affiliated firms. 
26 Japan Company Handbook contains the First and Second Section of Tokyo Stock Exchange listed firms’ 
firm specific information and financial data including the name of main bank, bank ownership, and bank 
loan amount data.  
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Worldscope.  These financial data are based on consolidated financial statements, which 
evaluate the performance of the business group as a whole, including spun-off companies 
and related units. Daily stock prices and daily Nikkei Average Index were retrieved from 
NEEDS. 
Initial spin-off data consist of observations announced between 2001 and 2003, 
totaling 293 spin-offs, including regular spin-offs (161) and merger-facilitated (132) spin-
offs.  Regular spin-offs are the transactions in which one of the divisions of the firm is 
separated from the parent firm and becomes a wholly-owned subsidiary of the parent firm.  
Merger-facilitated spin-offs are the transactions in which the separated division is merged 
into one of the existing subsidiaries within the firm.  Therefore, these two transactions are 
pure internal transactions without any change of governance or ownership structure of the 
firm.  The sample excludes 19 companies: 8 real estate, 7 finance, and 4 utility companies. 
In addition, 30 of the remaining samples are eliminated because the firms spun off more 
than one division.  Thus, the final sample includes 244 spin-off events. Table 10 
describes the annual frequency of Japanese corporate spin-offs by different types.  The 
annual frequency of spin-offs increased significantly from 72 in the first year (2001) to 
120 in 2002 and 101 in 2003.  Panel A of Table 11 shows the summary statistics of firm 
characteristics and bank governance variables.  Main banks own approximately 6% of the 
equity of the sample firms on average.  Almost 40% of the sample firms are affiliated 
with keiretsu.  Finally, about 57% of the sample firms have bank-appointed directors. 
Panel B of Table 11 summarizes the capital expenditures to total asset ratio and Tobin’s 
Q of the firms before and after the spin-offs.  The summaries of the capital expenditures 
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and Q variables are categorized by keiretsu-affiliation of the firms.  There is no 
significant difference in capital expenditures between the keiretsu-affiliated and non-
keiretsu-affiliated firms across the panel time frame of the analysis.  There is a significant 
difference in Tobin’s Q between the keiretsu-affiliated and non-keiretsu-affiliated firms 
before and after the spin-offs.  The significant difference of Q decreases after spin-offs, 
and the difference is not significant at year +2. 
Empirical Results 
Our study finds two main empirical results.  First, in Japan, the efficiency of 
internal capital markets increases through corporate spin-offs: investment becomes more 
sensitive to investment opportunities.  Second, banks’ monitoring roles seem to have a 
significant positive impact on the investment sensitivity of internal capital markets 
through spin-offs.  Model (1) of Table 12 reports the estimation results of equation (1) for 
the full sample. The estimate for the interaction term between the Q and AFTER dummy 
variable is positive at the 10% level; the firms’ sensitivity of investment to Tobin’s Q 
increases significantly after spin-offs.  This result is consistent with Gertner et al.’s 
(2002) contention that spin-offs may improve the allocation of capital. 
Model (2) of Table 12 reports the estimation results of equation (1), dividing the 
sample into two sub-samples based on whether the spin-off transaction is related or not.  
A spin-off is defined as related when the spun-off firm’s industry is related to the parent’s.  
Related spin-offs show a statistically significant increase in investment sensitivity 
(significant at the 5% level) after the internal reorganization, while unrelated transactions 
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do not.  However, it is not clear if the efficiency increase results from a conglomerate’s 
focus on its core business, because of the unique nature of Japanese spin-offs.  For 
example, in unrelated Japanese spin-offs, the spun-off unit still remains within the 
conglomerate.  This may confound the true meaning of corporate focus defined by 
relatedness. Therefore, we use alternative measures of corporate focus, for example, the 
Herfindahl index.  The Herfindahl index measures the focus of a conglomerate based on 
the size of each segment within the conglomerate.  The mere number of segments does 
not change after the spin-offs because spun-off firms remain in the conglomerate in 
Japanese spin-offs.  However, the size (e.g., sales) of a particular segment can increase 
due to improved efficiency after becoming independent from parent firms, which may 
affect the Herfindahl index. Thus, we divide the sample whether the Herfindahl index is 
increased or not to measure focus changes.  Model (3) of Table 12 reports that focus-
increasing spin-offs show increase in investment sensitivity after spin-offs at the 10% 
significance level.  This result is consistent with Gertner et al.’s (2002) finding that focus-
increasing spin-offs increase the investment efficiency of internal capital markets while 
non-focus-increasing spin-offs do not. 
 To examine how bank monitoring influences the investment sensitivity result 
above, we estimate the investment models using several sub-samples constructed based 
on various bank-related variables: keiretsu-affiliation, bank loan amount normalized by 
total assets, and main bank ownership. Hoshi et al. (1990) argue that keiretsu-affiliated 
firms are less liquidity constrained even when they are financially distressed, and this 
propping-up role may lead to monitoring the affiliated firms more closely.  Model (1) of 
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Table 13 reports that keiretsu-affiliated firms’ spin-offs show a significant increase in 
investment sensitivity, at the 5% significance level, after the transaction.  This supports 
the finding that the bank-centered group, keiretsu, may play a significant monitoring role 
in internal capital markets.  
Model (2) of Table 13 does not show any significant increase in investment 
sensitivity after spin-offs for either a high or low bank loan amount. We will elaborate on 
this result later relating to poorly performing firms (low Q) in Panel B of Table 14.  
However, when we investigate the sample with low and high main bank ownership, we 
find, as shown in Model (3) of Table 13, that there is an increase in investment sensitivity 
for the high main bank ownership sub-sample at the 10% significance level. This is 
consistent with Morck et al. (2000), showing that the lesser conflict between debt and 
equity holders with higher ownership affects investment policies by undertaking more 
good projects. This result implies that the main bank ownership may facilitate monitoring 
incentives in increasing investment sensitivity through spin-offs. 
Finally, Panel A of Table 14 further separates the spin-off-specific sub-samples of 
Models (2) and (3) of Table 3, based on bank-related and spin-off-specific variables, 
keiretsu-affiliation, and relatedness. Among the four combinations of relatedness and 
keiretsu-affiliation, only keiretsu-affiliated and related spin-offs show a significant 
increase in investment sensitivity as shown in Model (1) in Panel A of Table 14. This 
result is consistent with our bank-monitoring hypothesis that banks’ monitoring facilitates 
the investment efficiency of internal capital markets after spin-offs. As mentioned, 
relatedness in Japanese spin-offs is not appropriate for a proxy for corporate focus, 
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requiring some alternative measure such as the Herfindahl index. From the results of 
Model (2) in Panel A of Table 14, unrelated spin-offs, even if keiretsu-affiliated, do not 
show any significant increase in investment sensitivity. As shown in Model (3) of Panel 
A in Table 14, a significant increase of investment sensitivity of merger-facilitated spin-
offs is shown by keiretsu-affiliated spin-offs.  Thus, the bank-centered industrial groups, 
keiretsu, seem to play a significant monitoring role in investment policy in Japanese 
corporate spin-offs.   
Kang et al. (2000) show that banks have greater monitoring incentives for firms 
with poor investment opportunities (low Q), and that the announcement abnormal returns 
of Japanese mergers are positively related to the interaction term between main bank loan 
amount and the low Q dummy variable. They argue that poorly performing firms are 
more likely to be bank-monitored.  Panel B of Table 14 shows the estimated model with 
the sub-samples with high- and low-Q spin-offs under high and low bank loan amounts.  
Among the four combinations, only the high bank loan and low-Q sub-sample shows the 
positively significant coefficient of interaction term, β2, of equation (1), consistent with 
Kang et al.’s (2000) finding. Therefore, we conclude that these results are consistent with 
our bank-monitoring hypothesis in Japanese internal capital markets. 
Conclusion and Future Studies 
Our study is based on the basic Q-theory which predicts that firms should invest 
more if there are better investment opportunities. The Q variable is used as a proxy for 
investment opportunities and capital expenditures as investments.  Based on the basic 
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empirical framework of Q-theory, we study the investment policy changes in internal 
capital markets and the impact of banks’ monitoring in internal capital markets using 
Japanese corporate spin-offs. 
We analyze the Japanese corporate spin-offs announced from 2001 through 2003 
since the establishment of the new spin-offs law.  The Japanese spin-off data provides a 
unique empirical environment where we can focus on the effect of corporate 
restructurings on the efficiency of internal capital market, not confronted by the control 
issues.  We extend the studies on the relationship between Japanese corporate governance 
and Japanese deregulations using Japanese spin-offs.  Spin-offs are the end-result of 
Commercial Codes revisions of the Japanese capital market in the late 1990s and the 
early 2000s, which include revisions of stock repurchases, holding companies, and 
simplified mergers procedures. 
We find that the efficiency of internal capital markets in Japan increases through 
corporate spin-offs; efficiency of investment policy within the firm has increased.  Also, 
we find that related spin-offs increase investment efficiency after being spun-off.  
However, we explore this issue more with a more appropriate measure of corporate focus, 
such as the Herfindahl index and find that focus-increasing spin-off companies increase 
investment sensitivity consistent with Gertner et al. (2002).  Furthermore, we find that 
bank-centered spin-offs in Japan experience a significant increase in investment 
sensitivity after being spun off.  In addition, there is a significant increase in investment 
sensitivity for the spin-offs with low Q and high bank loans.  This is consistent with the 
argument that Japanese banks have a greater incentive to monitor the firms with low 
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investment opportunities (low Q), thus resulting in the improvement in investment 
efficiency after being spun-off. 
However, several future studies on empirical specifications emerged from the 
results of this study.  First, investment sensitivity analysis between capital expenditures 
and Tobin’s Q could be controlled by size variables such as natural logarithm of sales or 
total assets.  In addition to bank related variables, the size effect could contribute to the 
investment sensitivity.  Second, in addition to the bank and size variables, we could 
control the profitability or leverage of the firms.  The profitability or leverage variable 
such as operating income or debt to equity ratio could affect the investment sensitivity. 
Finally, cash flows could be used as the proxy for the investment opportunities instead of 
the capital expenditures.  Therefore, the robustness checks by controlling the size, 
profitability, or leverage and using cash flows for investment opportunities of the firms in 
empirical analysis may strengthen our arguments. 
In sum, our empirical evidence suggests that the efficiency of internal capital 
markets in Japan increases through spin-offs.  Also, banks’ monitoring roles seem to have 
significant positive impacts on investment sensitivity through spin-offs. 
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TABLES 
Table 10 Annual Frequency of Spin-offs and MA Spin-offs per Year 
This table lists the annual frequency of the Japanese spin-offs of listed firms in our sample, categorized by 
the merger-facilitated spin-offs.  The sample includes the finance, real estate, and utility companies, which 
we excluded for our analysis.  The sample of Japanese corporate spin-offs are obtained from MARR 
(Merger and Acquisition Research Report, Tokyo) published by REOCFF CO., which is the largest M&A 
data service in Japan and four major Japanese financial papers: Nihon Keizai Shimbun (Nikkei Economic 
Journal), Nihon Keizai Sangyo Shimbun (Nikkei Industrial Journal), Nihon Keizai Ryutuu Shimbun (Nikkei 
Distribution Journal), and Nihon Keizai Kinyuu Shimbun (Nikkei Finance Journal). 
 
Year Spin-Offs MA Spin-Offs Total 
2001 36 36 72 
2002 73 47 120 
2003 52 49 101 
Total 161 132 293 
  
Table 11 Summary Statistics before Spin-offs and Capital Expenditures and Tobin’s Q before and after Spin-offs 
This table provides the summary statistics of Japanese spin-offs samples listed in the First and Second section of Tokyo Stock Exchange, which are announced 
from January 1, 2001 through December 31st, 2003 and completed since effective date of the new corporate spin-offs law, April 1, 2001.  Financial data is 
retrieved from NEEDS (Nikkei Economic Electronic Databank System).  Keiretsu-affiliation information is retrieved from Industrial Groupings in Japan 2001 
published by Dodwell Marketing Consultants.   Main bank information, bank ownership, and consolidated bank loan data is collected from autumn versions of 
Japan Company Handbook between 2000 and 2003.  The estimation of Tobin’s Q is calculated as the sum of market value of equity and book value of debt 
divided by book value of total assets.  
 
Panel A. Summary Statistics before Spin-offs
 
Variables 
 
Mean 
 
Median 
Standard 
Deviation 
Total Assets (billions of yen) 918327 150916 1822521 
Sales (billions of yen) 923831 134946 1937767 
Capital Expenditures to Total Asset Ratio 0.0426 0.0333 0.0356 
Tobin’s Q 1.077 0.9498 0.5184 
Bank Loan to Total Asset Ratio 0.3063 0.3113 0.2035 
Bank Ownership 0.2061 0.2155 0.1049 
Main Bank Ownership 0.0590 0.0510 0.0420 
Proportion of Firms in keiretsu-affiliation    0.4029 - -
Proportion of Firms has Bank-Sent Director 0.5708 - - 
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Panel B. Capital Expenditures and Tobin’s Q before and after Spin-offs 
 
  Capital Expenditures to Total Asset Tobin’s - Q
  -2 -1 1 2 -2 -1 1 2
Mean      0.0430 0.0426 0.0382 0.0463 1.3049 1.0862 0.9638 1.1072Total (N=800) 
Median         
      
0.0383 0.0333 0.0349 0.0421 1.0760 0.9499 0.9273 1.0339
Mean 0.0394 0.0389 0.0374 0.0463 1.3974 1.1681 1.0151 1.1072Keiretsu – affiliated 
(N=352) Median         
      
0.0393 0.0399 0.0369 0.0421 1.1259 1.0093 0.9351 1.0339
Mean 0.0449 0.0454 0.0391 0.0413 1.2171 1.0179 0.9293 1.0392Non-keiretsu-
affiliated (N=458) Median 0.0336 0.0318 0.0316 0.0382 0.9924 0.9257 0.9230 0.9229 
(Keiretsu 
- Non-keiretsu) 
Difference 
(P-value) 
-0.0055 
(0.2156) 
-0.0064 
(0.1675) 
-0.0017 
(0.7111) 
0.0053 
(0.3941) 
0.1802* 
(0.0774) 
0.1415** 
(0.0402) 
0.0859* 
(0.0586) 
0.0670 
(0.0392) 
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Table 12 Investment Sensitivity of Pre- and Post-Spin-offs 
This table reports the investment sensitivity analysis results of following panel equation,  
IKit = αi + β1*Qit + β2*Qit*AFTER + β2*AFTER + ∑tγt*YEARt + εit. IK is calculated as the ratio of capital expenditure to the book value of total asset. Q is Tobin’s 
Q computed as the ratio of the sum of book value of debt and market value of equity to the book value of assets. AFTER is the dummy variable, which is 
indicated as 1 for years -2, and -1, and 0 for years +1, and +2.  ∑tγt*YEARt is year dummy variables.  The numbers in parentheses below the coefficient estimates 
are p-values. The sample is sub-categorized by relatedness and merger-facilitation.  If the parent and subsidiaries are in the same industries, then the spin-off is 
considered to be related.  Merger-facilitated transactions spin-off one division and it is merged to one of existing subsidiary within the conglomerate.  
 
Model (1) Total (2) Relatedness (3) Herfindahl Index Focus (4) Merger-Facilitation
  Related Unrelated Increasing Non-Increasing Regular Merger
Tobin’s Q 
 
0.0017 
(0.378) 
0.0035 
(0.2518) 
0.0025 
(0.300) 
-0.0038 
(0.190) 
0.0118*** 
(0.000) 
0.0112** 
(0.014) 
-0.0023 
(0.347) 
Tobin’s Q 
× After 
0.0092* 
(0.076) 
0.0229** 
(0.0206) 
0.0078 
(0.226) 
0.0130* 
(0.064) 
0.0093 
(0.258) 
0.0020 
(0.773) 
0.0100 
(0.215) 
After -0.0102 
(0.101) 
-0.0277** 
(0.0218) 
-0.0071 
(0.370) 
-0.0188 
(0.431) 
-0.0038 
(0.796) 
-0.0026 
(0.774) 
-0.01215 
(0.181) 
No. of Firms 244 130 114   93 65 128 116 
No. of Obs. 800 425 375   331 228 385 415 
R-square 0.0239 0.0316 0.0216   0.0589 0.0508 0.1074 0.0222 
*,**, and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels respectively. 
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Table 13 Investment Sensitivity of Pre- and Post-Spin-offs 
This table reports the investment sensitivity analysis results of following panel equation,  
IKit = αi + β1*Qit + β2*Qit*AFTER + β2*AFTER + ∑tγt*YEARt + εit. IK is calculated as the ratio of capital expenditure to the book value of total asset. Q is Tobin’s 
Q computed as the ratio of the sum of book value of debt and market value of equity to the book value of assets. AFTER is the dummy variable, which is 
indicated as 1 for years -2, and -1, and 0 for years +1, and +2.  ∑tγt*YEARt is year dummy variables.  The numbers in parentheses below the coefficient estimates 
are p-values.  The sample is sub-categorized by bank-related firm specific variables: keiretsu-affiliation, below and above sample medians of, bank loan amount 
normalized by book value of total assets, and main bank ownership. 
 
Model (1) Keiretsu (2) Bank Loan Amount (3) Main Bank Ownership
 Affiliated None High Low High Low
Tobin’s Q 
 
0.0052** 
(0.015) 
-0.0002 
(0.961) 
-0.0049 
(0.129) 
0.0067*** 
(0.008) 
0.0018 
(0.453) 
0.0021 
(0.545) 
Tobin’s Q 
× After 
0.0147** 
(0.015) 
0.0066 
(0.391) 
0.0127 
(0.137) 
0.0069 
(0.302) 
0.0107* 
(0.098) 
0.0075 
(0.401) 
After -0.0089 
(0.211) 
-0.0116 
(0.222) 
-0.0087 
(0.352) 
-0.0135 
(0.115) 
-0.0120 
(0.133) 
-0.0079 
(0.437) 
No. of Firms 105 139 120 124 137 107 
No. of Obs. 352 448 394 406 451 349 
R-square 0.0687 0.0141 0.0243 0.0602 0.0434 0.0311 
*,**, and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels respectively. 
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Table 14 Investment Sensitivity of Pre- and Post-spin-offs 
This table reports the investment sensitivity analysis results of following panel equation, IKit = αi + β1*Qit + β2*Qit*AFTER + β2*AFTER + ∑tγt*YEARt + εit. IK is 
calculated as the ratio of capital expenditure to the book value of total asset. Q is Tobin’s Q computed as the ratio of the sum of book value of debt and market 
value of equity to the book value of assets. AFTER is the dummy variable, which is indicated as 1 for years -2, and -1, and 0 for years +1, and +2.  YEARt is year 
dummy variables.  The numbers in parentheses below the coefficient estimates are p-values.  The sample is sub-categorized by combinations of spin-offs and 
bank-related firm specific variables. 
 
Panel A. Keiretsu-Affiliation vs. Focus and Merger-Facilitated Spin-offs
Model (1) Related (2) Unrelated (3) Merger-Facilitation (4) Regular Spin-offs
 Keiretsu Non-Keiretsu Keiretsu Non-Keiretsu Keiretsu Non-Keiretsu Keiretsu Non-Keiretsu
Tobin’s Q 
 
-0.0013 
(0.657) 
0.0106** 
(0.027) 
0.0041 
(0.122) 
-0.0053 
(0.148) 
-0.0022 
(0.369) 
-0.0017 
(0.654) 
0.0066 
(0.296) 
0.0087 
(0.160) 
Tobin’s Q 
× After 
0.0281*** 
(0.001) 
0.0027 
(0.838) 
0.0089 
(0.230) 
0.0072 
(0.413) 
0.0202** 
(0.016) 
-0.0010 
(0.937) 
0.0049 
(0.506) 
-0.0009 
(0.936) 
After -0.0131 
(0.194) 
-0.0183 
(0.228) 
-0.0055 
(0.533) 
-0.0038 
(0.729) 
-0.0121* 
(0.193) 
-0.0103 
(0.470) 
-0.0017 
(0.855) 
-0.0038 
(0.781) 
No. of Firms 51 80 52 61 51 65 54 76 
No. of Obs. 172 257 172 199 186 229 164 227 
R-square 0.1171 0.0469 0.0521 0.0227 0.0582 0.0320 0.0584 0.0960 
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Panel B. Q-dummy vs. Bank Loan Amount
Model (1) Low Q (2) High Q
 High Bank Loan Low Bank Loan High Bank Loan Low Bank Loan
Tobin’s Q 
 
-0.0074 
(0.613) 
-0.0433*** 
(0.000) 
0.0053 
 (0.121) 
-0.0013 
(0.774) 
Tobin’s Q 
× After 
0.0526** 
(0.034) 
0.0372 
(0.104) 
0.006 
(0.577) 
-0.0194 
(0.218) 
After -0.0529*** 
(0.009) 
-0.0138 
(0.433) 
0.0054 
(0.729) 
0.0151 
(0.437) 
No. of Firms 51 65 54 76 
No. of Obs. 186 229 164 227 
R-square 0.0582 0.0320 0.0584 0.0960 
*, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels respectively.
  
GENERAL CONCLUSION 
We study the relationship between internal capital market and banks relationship 
by examining the Japanese corporate spin-offs from 2001 through 2003 since the 
establishment of new spin-offs law in Japan.  The Japanese spin-off data provide a unique 
environment in which we can focus on the effect of corporate restructurings on the 
efficiency of internal capital markets, not confronted by the control issues.   
Empirical evidence of this study shows that there are significant increase in 
efficiency of internal capital markets after spin-offs; positive abnormal returns around the 
announcement; significant positive market-adjusted returns after the spin-offs for 12, 24, 
and 36 months; a significant increase in focus of firms in terms of the Herfindahl index; a 
significant reduction in the diversification discount; and a significant increase in 
investment sensitivity after the spin-off transactions.  Furthermore, these increases of 
internal capital market efficiency are closely related to bank relationship variables such as 
keiretsu-affiliation, main bank ownership, bank loan amount, or existence of a bank-
appointed director.  Thus, our empirical evidence suggests that there is a significant 
relationship between internal capital markets and banks in Japan; the closer relationship 
with banks creates shareholder wealth, increases the focus of firms, reduces the 
diversification discounts, and increases the investment efficiency after the internal capital 
market reorganizations through spin-offs. 
In sum, our empirical evidence suggests that the efficiency of internal capital 
markets in Japan increases through spin-offs.  Also, banks’ monitoring roles seem to have 
significant positive impacts on efficiency of internal capital markets. 
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